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I. INTRODUCTION

II. DOCTRINE OF COMPLETENESS
The doctrine of completeness existed in the common law at least as far back as the
early 1600s.7 At its most basic, this doctrine can be stated as follows: ³WKH RSSRQHQW
against whom a part of an utterance has been put in, may in his turn complement it by
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1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that appropriate procedural safeguards are to
be used to protect a suspect¶s right against self-incrimination and to inform the suspect about the right to counsel).
2. Confessions by defendants are routinely introduced against them at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)
(providing that statements of an opposing party are admissible as non-hearsay when offered against that party).
3. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2) (providing that hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted); FED. R. EVID. 802 (providing that hearsay is generally not admissible).
4. Or the equivalent state Rule 106 for state prosecutions.
5. FED. R. EVID. 106.
6. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
7. 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 601 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
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Consider a scenario in which a defendant is charged with distributing large quantities
of narcotics. After he was arrested and waived his right to remain silent and be represented
by counsel,1 WKHGHIHQGDQWWROGDGHWHFWLYH³<HDK,SUREDEO\VROGPHWKDERXWDKXQGUHG
WLPHV´7KHVXVSHFWWKHQPXPEOHGLQGHFLSKHUDEO\WRKLPVHOIDQGVWDWHG³&RPPXQLVWVSLHV
KDYHEHHQWKUHDWHQLQJWRGHFDSLWDWHP\HQWLUHIDPLO\´$WWULDOWKHGHtective testifies that
the defendant admitted to distributing methamphetamine on multiple occasions. 2
Unsurprisingly, the prosecutor does not elicit testimony about the second statement
involving communist spies. During cross-examination, the defense seeks to introduce the
statement about communists in order to further a possible compulsion defense, but the
prosecutor objects that the statement is hearsay. 3 How should the court rule?
:KHWKHUWKHVHFRQGVWDWHPHQWLVDGPLVVLEOHGHSHQGVRQWKHFRXUW¶VLQWHUSUHtation of
Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,4 which provides, ³>L@f a party introduces all or
part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at
that time, of any other part²or any other writing or recorded statement²that in fairness
RXJKWWREHFRQVLGHUHGDWWKHVDPHWLPH´ 5 7KHFRXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZLOOGHSHQGRQLWV
ORFDWLRQEHFDXVHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VIDLOXUHWRGLUHFWO\DGGUHVVWKLVLVVXHZKHQLWKDGWKH
chance in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey 6 has led to a significant split between the circuit
courts. The resulting system in which the interpretation of Rule 106 depends on location
is untenable in a modern age when crimes and investigations frequently cross jurisdictional
boundaries. Both defendants and prosecutors are entitled to consistent rules for this issue
that is likely to be present in every case in which a defendant has made an inculpatory
statement. Thus, the Supreme Court should provide consistency for the interpretation of
Rule 106.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the background of the doctrine
of completeness. Part III examines the Rainey decision, with discussion on what the
Supreme Court failed to address about Rule 106. Part IV surveys the split of authority in
the case law. Part V provides a suggestion of how the Supreme Court should answer the
questions it failed to answer in Rainey in order to provide clear guidelines for Rule 106
analysis.
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putting in the remainder, in order to secure for the tribunal a complete understanding of
WKHWRWDOWHQRUDQGHIIHFWRIWKHXWWHUDQFH´8 Under this doctrine, the opponent was allowed
to put in the remainder of the utterance because:
the thought as a whole, and as it actually existed, cannot be ascertained without taking the
utterance as a whole and comparing the successive elements and their mutual relations. To
look at a part alone would be to obtain a false notion of the thought. The total²that is to say,
the real²meaning can be got at only by going on to the end of the utterance. One part cannot
be separated and taken by itself without doing injustice, by [producing] misrepresentation.9

Significantly, the doctrine had a trumping function that allowed for introduction of the
remainder even though it would otherwise be inadmissible under rules of exclusion such
as hearsay.10
However, this doctrine did not allow the opponent unfettered license to introduce
any and all remainders. Indeed, there were two requirements for the introduction of a
remainder. FiUVW³No utterance irrelevant to the issue is receivable.´11 6HFRQG³No more
of the remainder of the utterance than concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of
the first part, LVUHFHLYDEOH´12 As a further limitation, the remainder was not considered to
be evidence itself, but was only an aid to help in the understanding of the utterance as a
whole.13
Rule 106 was adopted in 1975 and was amended in 1987 and 2011. 14 As originally
proposed, the rule would have stated:
When a writing, statement, or conversation, or part thereof, is introduced by a party, an
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or related writing,
statement, or conversation relevant to that introduced. Nothing herein precludes any party
from introducing on his own motion any other relevant part or related writing, statement, or
conversation.15
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8. Id. at 653. This doctrine applied to both oral and written statements. Id. at 595 n.1.
9. Id. at 595.
10. See Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
75 TEX. L. REV. 51, 54 (1996).
11. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at 656.
12. Id. This restriction existed ³so that the opponent shall not, under cloak of this conceded right, put in
utterances which do not come within its principle and would be otherwise inadmissible.´ Id.
13. Id. at 656, 659.
14. See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee¶s notes to 1987 and 2011 amendments.
15. 21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
§ 5071 (2d ed. 2018).
16. Id.
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Essentially, the proposed rule would have kept the common law doctrine but sped up the
process of completing the statement.
The final draft departed from the common law doctrine by eliminating its application
WR RUDO VWDWHPHQWV DQG E\ LQMHFWLQJ D FRQFHSW RI IDLUQHVV ³:KHQ D ZULWLQJ RU UHFRUGHG
statement or part thereof, is introduced by a party, he may be required at that time to
introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness
WREHFRQVLGHUHGZLWKLW´ 16
,QGHHG WKH DGYLVRU\ FRPPLWWHH ³DEDQGRQHG DQ\ FODLP WKDW WKH 3URSRVHG 5XOH
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FRGLILHGWKHFRPPRQODZ´17 7KH'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFHZDQWHGWRDGG³ZKLFKLVRWKHUZLVH
DGPLVVLEOH´EXW the advisory committee rejected this proposal.18 The advisory committee
UHMHFWHG WKLV SURSRVDO EDVHG RQ DQ H[SODQDWLRQ WKDW ³WKH µIDLUQHVV¶ VWDQGDUG LPSOLFLWO\
UHTXLUHGWKDWFRPSOHWLQJHYLGHQFHEHDGPLVVLEOH´19 However, when the Department of
Justice subsequently made this same request when the proposed rule was before the Senate
IRU FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WKH DGYLVRU\ FRPPLWWHH ³QHLWKHU DGPLWWHG QRU GHQLHG WKH DVVXPSWLRQ
WKDWWKH5XOHDVGUDIWHGDOORZHGWKHXVHRILQDGPLVVLEOHIRUFRPSOHWLRQ´ 20
The version of the UXOHWKDWZDVDGRSWHGLQUHDGDVIROORZV³:KHQDZULWLQJ
or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require
him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement
which ought LQ IDLUQHVV WR EH FRQVLGHUHG FRQWHPSRUDQHRXVO\ ZLWK LW´ 21 The advisory
committee note remained silent as to whether a remainder had to be otherwise admissible
in order to be introduced under this rule. The 1987 amendment simply removed gendered
pronouns from the rule and the 2011 amendment was only stylistic. 22 The advisory
committee notes continued to remain silent on whether inadmissible evidence could be
used for completeness.
III. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP. V. RAINEY

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at § 5078.1.
Id.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5078.1.
Id. § 5071.
See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee¶s notes to 1987 and 2011 amendments.
488 U.S. 153, 156 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 156±57.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 159.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 159.
Id.
Id. at 159±60.
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey was a product liability case that was filed after a
Navy flight instructor and her student were killed when the aircraft lost altitude and
crashed.23 Because there were no survivors and the aircraft was severely damaged, the
cause of the crash could not be determined with exactness.24 The plaintiffs alleged that the
crash was caused by an equipment malfunction, while the defendants claimed that pilot
error was the cause. 25 This was the only seriously disputed question at trial. 26
One of the plaintiffs was John Rainey, a Navy flight instructor who was the husband
of the deceased pilot.27 A few months after the crash, Rainey wrote a letter in which he
took issue with an investigative report and outlined his own theory that the crash was
caused by equipment malfunction.28 5DLQH\GLGQRWWHVWLI\LQWKHSODLQWLIIV¶FDVHLQFKLHI
but was called as a witness by the defense.29 During direct examination, the defense asked
Rainey about statements in the letter that tended to suggest that pilot error was the cause
of the crash, and he admitted making the statements. 30 During cross-examination,
5DLQH\¶VFRXQVHODVNHGKLPZKHWKHUKHKDGDOVRVWDWHGLQWKHOHWWHUWKDWWKHSULPDU\FDXVH
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of the crash was equipment malfunction. 31 Before Rainey could answer, the judge
sustained a defense objection and further questioning along that line was cut off. 32
The jury found in favor of the defendants, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 33 The
court held that under Rule 106, it was reversible error to prohibit cross-examination about
WKH SDUWV RI 5DLQH\¶V OHWWHU WKDW ZRXOG KDYH SXW WKH DGPLVVLRQV KH PDGH RQ GLUHFW LQ
context.34
The Supreme Court began its analysis of this issue by noting that Rule 106 had
³SDUWLDOO\ FRGLILHG WKH GRFWULQH RI FRPSOHWHQHVV´35 Unfortunately, the Court did not
H[SODLQZKLFKSDUWRIWKHGRFWULQHZDVFRGLILHG7KH&RXUWDOVRVWDWHGWKDW³>F@OHDUO\WKH
FRQFHUQVXQGHUO\LQJ5XOHDUHUHOHYDQWKHUH´EXWWKH&RXUWGHFOLQHGWR³H[SORU>H@WKH
scope and meaning of Rule 106´36 Instead, the Court held that Rainey should have been
allowed to testify about the portion of his letter attributing the crash to equipment
PDOIXQFWLRQEHFDXVH³ZKHQRQHSDUW\KDVPDGHXVHRIDSRUWLRQRIDGRFXPHQWVXFKWKDW
misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through presentation of another
portion, the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant and therefore
DGPLVVLEOHXQGHU5XOHVDQG´37
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VIDLOXUHWRDGGUHVV5XOHLVSX]]OLQJJLYHQWKDWWKH Court
essentially admitted that the principle supporting Rule 106 was directly applicable to the
case. It may be that the Court felt that because Rainey actually testified on direct and was
asked about the letter containing his opinion, he should have been able to testify on crossexamination about his entire opinion directly, rather than using Rule 106 to get his opinion
EHIRUH WKH MXU\ 5HJDUGOHVV RI WKH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQ LWV IDLOXUH WR DGGUHVV 5XOH  KDV
resulted in a system in which the meaning and scope of the rule depend on where the court
addressing the issue is located.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
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31. Id. at 160.
32. Id.
33. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 160.
34. Id. at 160±61.
35. Id. at 172.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. By its express terms, Rule 106 does not apply to oral statements that are not recorded. However, many
courts have held that the principles and guidelines of Rule 106 apply to oral statements pursuant to Rule 611,
which states: ³[t]he court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to: make those procedures effective for determining the truth . . . ´ FED R. EVID.
611(a)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Pacquette, 557 F. App¶x 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that the principles
of Rule 106 apply to oral statements under Rule 611); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 734 (10th
Cir. 2010) (stating that the doctrine of completeness in Rule 106 is applicable to oral statements by virtue of Rule
611); United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that the principles of Rule 106 apply to
oral statements under Rule 611).
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It is not surprising that, left to their own interpretations, the circuit courts have taken
a variety of positions on the scope and meaning of Rule 106. Indeed, the decisions of the
circuit courts are far from uniform on whether Rule 106 has a trumping function that
allows for remainders that are otherwise inadmissible or is a rule that controls only the
timing of introduction.38
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A. Rule of Admissibility
One interpretation is to treat Rule 106 as a rule of admissibility that allows for the
introduction of otherwise inadmissible remainders. The First, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits take this position.
1. First Circuit
The First Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v.
Bucci, in which the defendant had been convicted of various drug and firearm offenses
that occurred as part of a plan to rob a drug dealer. 39 At trial, the prosecution introduced
redacted portions of a recorded conversation between the drug dealer and a cooperating
witness who both testified at trial.40 The defendant moved under Rule 106 to have the
prosecution introduce other portions of the redacted recording, but the trial court denied
the motion.41 The defendant argued on appeal that the remainder of the recording should
have been admitted at the same time because it undermined the credibility of the witnesses
and because the redacted excerpts were fragmented and confusing. 42 The defendant
conceded that the remainder would be inadmissible hearsay if he had independently
offered it for admission into evidence. 43
The First Circuit began its analysis by stating that its position was that Rule 106
³FRGLILHVWKHFRPPRQODZGRFWULQHRIFRPSOHWHQHVV´44 The court then stated that iWV³FDVH
law unambiguously establishes that the rule of completeness may be invoked to facilitate
WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIRWKHUZLVHLQDGPLVVLEOHHYLGHQFH´ 45 However, the court ruled that the
WULDOFRXUW¶VUHIXVDOWRUHTXLUHWKHUHPDLQGHUGLGQRWSUHMXGLFHWKH defendant because his
attorney was able to use the remainder to essentially destroy the credibility of the witnesses
on cross-examination and because the prosecution itself clarified any misapprehension that
resulted from the recording being redacted.46 In essence, the court found that there was no
prejudice because the content of the remainder was disclosed to the jury.

The Tenth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v.
Lopez-Medina, in which the defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute.47 During trial, the defense introduced the fact that a co-defendant
had already pled guilty to the crimes that defendant was charged with in order to support
an argument that the guilty party had already been convicted and the defendant was just
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39. 525 F.3d 116, 120±21 (1st Cir. 2008).
40. Id. at 133.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bucci, 525 F.3d at 133.
45. Id. (citing United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Awon, 135 F.3d
96, 101 (1st Cir. 1998)). The court recognized that ³[o]ther circuits have held differently,´ but stated that it would
³adhere to [its] own precedent.´ Id.
46. Id. at 134.
47. 596 F.3d 716, 722 (10th Cir. 2010).
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an innocent bystander.48 The prosecution was then allowed to introduce that factual basis
that was included in the co-GHIHQGDQW¶V SOHD VWDWHPHQW VSHFLILFDOO\ WKH FR-GHIHQGDQW¶V
statement that he had aided and abetted the defendant in jointly possessing
methamphetamine with intent to distribute.49 The defendant argued on appeal that his right
to confrontation was violated when the court admitted the co-GHIHQGDQW¶V IDFWXDO
allocution.50
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the co-GHIHQGDQW¶V IDFWXDO
allocution would have been inadmissible if the prosecution had attempted to introduce it
by itself.51 However, the court held that the evidence was properly introduced under Rule
 ³>H@YHQ LI the fact allocution would [have] be[en] subject to a hearsay objection
. . . ´52 7KLVLVEHFDXVH³WKHSXUSRVHRI5XOHLVWRSUHYHQWDSDUW\IURPPLVOHDGLQJWKH
jury by allowing into the record relevant portions of a writing or recorded statement which
FODULI\RUH[SODLQWKHSDUWDOUHDG\UHFHLYHG´53
The Tenth Circuit then held that evidence must satisfy a four-part test in order to be
DGPLVVLEOHXQGHU5XOHWKHUHOHYDQWSRUWLRQRIDZULWLQJPXVWRSHUDWHVRWKDW³  LW
explains the admitted evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in context, (3) avoids
PLVOHDGLQJWKHMXU\DQG  LQVXUHVIDLUDQGLPSDUWLDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHHYLGHQFH´ 54
The court held that the factual basis in the co-GHIHQGDQW¶V DOORFXWLRQ VDWLVILHG WKLV WHVW
because it placed the co-GHIHQGDQW¶VSOHDLQFRQWH[WLQWKDWLWDYRLGHGPLVOHDGLQJWKHMXU\
into believing that the co-defendant had accepted sole responsibility for possessing the
methamphetamine himself.55
3. Eleventh Circuit
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48. Id. at 724.
49. Id. at 725.
50. Id. at 733.
51. Id. at 730±31.
52. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735; see also, United States v. Lemon, 714 F. App¶x 851, 860 (10th Cir. 2017)
(stating that Rule 106 allows inadmissible hearsay evidence if otherwise appropriate).
53. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735 (quoting United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 481 (4th Cir. 2004)).
54. Id. (quoting United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 1995)).
55. Id.
56. 432 F.3d 1189, 1199±1200 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813 (2006).
57. Id. at 1222.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States
v. Baker, in which eleven defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.56
At trial, the prosecution had a detective testify about inculpatory statements that one
defendant made when questioned after arrest.57 The defendant sought to question the
detective about the exculpatory portions of his post-arrest statements, but the trial court
denied his motion to do so.58
The Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court had erred.59 The court stated that under
Rule 106³WKHH[FXOSDWRU\SRUWLRQRIDGHIHQGDQW¶VVWDWHPHQWVKRXOGEHDGPLWWHGLILWLV
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UHOHYDQWWRDQLVVXHLQWKHFDVHDQGQHFHVVDU\WRFODULI\RUH[SODLQWKHSRUWLRQUHFHLYHG´60
%HFDXVHWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWDWHPHQWZDVUHOHYDQWWRKLVLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHFRQVSLUDF\DQG
was necessary to clarify the other statements he made to the detective, he should have been
allowed to introduce the remainder.61
4. D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v.
Sutton, in which two defendants were convicted of various conspiracy and bribery
charges.62 During the trial, the prosecution had introduced portions of taped conversations
between one of the defendDQWVDQGDZLWQHVVWKDWFRXOGEHXVHGWRVKRZWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
consciousness of guilt.63 The defendant attempted to introduce other exculpatory portions
RI D FRQYHUVDWLRQ EXW WKH WULDO FRXUW VXVWDLQHG WKH SURVHFXWLRQ¶V REMHFWLRQ RQ KHDUVD\
grounds.64
The D.C&LUFXLWEHJDQLWVDQDO\VLVE\QRWLQJWKDW³HYHU\PDMRUUXOHRIH[FOXVLRQLQ
WKH)HGHUDO5XOHVRI(YLGHQFHFRQWDLQVWKHSURYLVRµH[FHSWDVRWKHUZLVHSURYLGHGE\WKHVH
UXOHV¶´65 Because Rule 106 does not contain this language, the court concluded that it
should not be construed in a restrictive manner.66 Thus, the court held:
Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of some
otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence
should be considered contemporaneously. A contrary construction raises the specter of
distorted and misleading trials, and creates difficulties for both litigants and the trial court.67

B. Rule of Timing Only
Another interpretation treats Rule 106 as only a rule of timing that does not allow
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60. Id.
61. Baker, 432 F.3d at 1222; see also, United States v. Pacquette, 557 F. App¶x 933, 936±37 (11th Cir. 2014)
(holding that Rule 106 applies to exculpatory statements).
62. 801 F.2d 1346, 1348±49 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
63. Id. at 1366±67.
64. Id. at 1367.
65. Id. at 1368 (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5078).
66. Id.
67. Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1369.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1370.
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The court held that under Rule 106, the prosecution should be allowed to introduce
inculpatory statements and the defense can then argue that the statements are misleading
because they are presented out of context. 68 7KH WULDO FRXUW WKHQ SHUPLWV ³VXFK OLPLWHG
portions to be contemporaneously introduced as will remove the distortion that otherwise
ZRXOGDFFRPSDQ\WKHSURVHFXWLRQ¶VHYLGHQFH´ 69
The court then examined the disputed statements. Because the remainder of the
VWDWHPHQWV UHEXWWHG WKH SURVHFXWLRQ¶V FODLP WKDW WKH RWKHU VWDWHPHQWV LQGLFDWHG WKDW WKH
defendant had the required guilty mental state, the court held that the defendant should
have been allowed to enter the remainder into evidence. 70
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for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible remainders. The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits take this position.
1. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v.
Hassan, in which three defendants were convicted of offenses related to terrorism.71 At
trial, the prosecution presented a training video posted on the internet that one of the
defendants made in which the defendant made several statements that could be interpreted
as calling for a violent jihad.72 The defendant then sought to introduce postings he made
in response to critical comments from other users of the internet site. 73 Specifically, the
defendant sought to introduce a specific post in which he claimed that he did not support
terrorists.74
The Fourth Circuit QRWHGWKDWXQGHU5XOHDWULDOFRXUW³PD\DOORZLQWRWKHUHFRUG
µrelevant portions of otherwise excluded testimony which clarify or explain the part
already received,¶ in order to µprevent a party from misleading the jury¶ by failing to
introduce the HQWLUHW\RIWKHVWDWHPHQWRUGRFXPHQW´75 However, the court stated that Rule
³GRHVQRWµUHQGHUDGPLVVLEOH. . . evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the
KHDUVD\UXOHV¶´76 1RUGRHV5XOH³UHTXLUHWKHDGPLVVLRQRIVHOI-serving, exculpatory
sWDWHPHQWVPDGHE\DSDUW\ZKLFKDUHEHLQJVRXJKWIRUDGPLVVLRQE\WKDWVDPHSDUW\´ 77
7KHFRXUWKHOGWKDWWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWDWHPHQWVZHUHSURSHUO\H[FOXGHG
because they were inadmissible hearsay.78
2. Sixth Circuit

742 F.3d 104, 110 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Bellin, 264 F.3d 391, 414 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Hassan, 742 F.3d at 134 (quoting United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Id. (quoting Lentz, 524 F.3d at 526).
Id.
89 F. App¶x 529, 531 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 532.
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The Sixth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v.
Shaver, in which the defendant was convicted of mail fraud.79 During an interview with a
postal inspector, the defendant admitted to acts that constituted elements of the offense. 80
However, the defendant also claimed that he had acted innocently and had only followed
KLV PRWKHU¶V LQVWUXFWLRQV 81 7KH SRVWDO LQVSHFWRU WHVWLILHG DW WULDO DERXW WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V
admissions, but the trial court refused to allow cross-H[DPLQDWLRQDERXWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
exculpatory statements.82 The defendant argued on appeal that he should have been able
to introduce his exculpatory statements under the doctrine of completeness. 83
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by stating that, as codified, Rule 106 merely
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controls the order iQ ZKLFK HYLGHQFH LV LQWURGXFHG DQG GRHV QRW ³PDNH LQDGPLVVLEOH
HYLGHQFH DGPLVVLEOH´84 7KH FRXUW WKHQ KHOG ³&RPSOHWHQHVV D FRPPRQ-law doctrine,
GRHV QRW RXWZHLJK WKH KHDUVD\ UXOHV EHFDXVH µ>K@HDUVD\ LV QRW DGPLVVLEOH H[FHSW DV
provided by these rules or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
VWDWXWRU\ DXWKRULW\¶ ([FXOSDWRU\ KHDUVD\ PD\ QRW FRPH LQ VROHO\ RQ WKH EDVLV RI
FRPSOHWHQHVV´85 %HFDXVHWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWDWHPHQWVZDVLQDGPLVVLEOH
hearsay, the court held that it was properly excluded.86
3. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v.
Ramos-Caraballo, in which the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine.87 During the trial, the defense attorney attempted to impeach an officer
during cross-H[DPLQDWLRQE\EULQJLQJXSLQFRQVLVWHQFLHVEHWZHHQWKHRIILFHU¶VJUDQGMXU\
testimony, suppression hearing testimony, and police report.88 The prosecution then
moved, and was allowed, to introduce the complete grand jury testimony, the complete
testimony at the suppression hearing, and the complete police report under Rule 106. 89
The defendant argued on appeal that this was erroneous. 90
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by stating that under Rule 1 ³WKH SDUW\
urging admission of an excluded conversation must specify the portion of the testimony
that is relevant to the issue at trial and that qualifies or explains portions already
DGPLWWHG´91 The court then stated that:

The court determined that rather than trying to clear up a misunderstanding that
UHVXOWHGIURPWKHGHIHQGDQWRQO\SXWWLQJVRPHRIWKHRIILFHU¶VVWDWHPHQWVLQWRHYLGHQFH
the prosecution was actually attempting to improperly bolster its witness. 93 Because Rule
³SHUPLWVQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQVHWWLQJWKHFRQWH[WDQGFODULI\LQJWKHDQVZHUVJLYHQRQ
cross-examination; it is not proper to admit all prior consistent statements simply to bolster
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84. Shaver, 89 F. App¶x at 532.
85. Id. at 533 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 802).
86. Id. at 535; see also United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that ³[e]xculpatory
hearsay may not come in solely on the basis of completeness´) (quoting Shaver, at 526).
87. 375 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2004)
88. Id. at 802.
89. Id. at 801. There were some redactions that were agreed upon.
90. Id. at 802.
91. Id. at 803 (quoting United States v. King, 351 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2013)).
92. Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d at 803 (internal citations and alterations omitted).
93. Id.
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³Rule 106, the rule of completeness, which is limited to writings,´ does not ³empower a
court to admit unrelated hearsay in the interest of fairness and completeness when that
hearsay does not come within a defined hearsay exception.´ Furthermore, the rule does not
come into play when ³a few inconsistencies between out-of-court and in-court statements
are revealed through cross-examination; rather, it operates to ensure fairness where a
misunderstanding or distortion created by the other party can only be averted by the
introduction of the full text of the out-of-court statement.´92
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the credibility of a ZLWQHVVZKRKDVEHHQLPSHDFKHGE\SDUWLFXODUV´94 Thus, the court held
WKDWWKHWULDOFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQWRDGPLWWKHHQWLUHVWDWHPHQWVZDVHUURQHRXV 95
4. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v.
Collicott, in which the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute.96 At trial, the prosecution called a witness who was present during
a drug transaction conducted by the defendant. 97 The defense asked the witness about
statements she made to a police officer, but she stated that she could not remember making
the statements.98 The prosecution then called the police officer and was allowed, over
REMHFWLRQWRLQWURGXFHWKHZLWQHVV¶HQWLUHVWDWHPHQWWKURXJKWKHRIILFHU 99 The defendant
argued at trial and on appeal that this constituted the improper admission of hearsay
evidence.100
7KH 1LQWK &LUFXLW EHJDQ LWV DQDO\VLV E\ KROGLQJ WKDW WKH ZLWQHVV¶ VWDWHPHQW ZDV
hearsay.101 7KHFRXUWWKHQDGGUHVVHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDUJXPHQWWKDW the evidence was
DGPLVVLEOHXQGHU5XOH,QGRLQJVRWKHFRXUWZDVJXLGHGE\WKHJHQHUDOUXOHWKDW³5XOH
GRHVQRWFRPSHODGPLVVLRQRIRWKHUZLVHLQDGPLVVLEOHKHDUVD\HYLGHQFH´ 102 The court
WKHQKHOGWKDWEHFDXVHWKHZLWQHVV¶RXW-of-court statements to the officer did not fall within
any exception to the hearsay rule, they were inadmissible regardless of Rule 106 and the
trial court erred by allowing them to be introduced into evidence. 103
C. Discretionary Admissibility
A minority of circuits view Rule 106 as a rule of admissibility that provides a court
with discretion to allow the introduction of otherwise inadmissible remainders if necessary
for the ascertainment of truth. The Second and Seventh Circuits take this approach.
1. Second Circuit
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94. Id. (quoting United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2001).
95. Id.
96. 92 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 1996).
97. Id. at 976.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 976±77.
100. Id. at 978.
101. Collicott, 92 F.3d at 978±84.
102. Id. at 983 (quoting Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1995)).
103. Id.; see also, United States v. Meraz, 663 F. App¶x 580, 581 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that Rule 106 ³does
not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence´) (quoting Collicott, 92 F.3d at 983).
104. 399 F. App¶x 641, 644 (2d Cir. 2010).
105. Id. at 645.
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The Second Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States
v. Gonzalez, in which two defendants were convicted of various drug and conspiracy
crimes.104 At trial, the government introduced the statement of defendant number one that
a murder victim had robbed drug dealers in order to prove that the murder was tied to the
drug conspiracy involving the defendants. 105 Both defendants argued on appeal that the
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WULDOFRXUWVKRXOGKDYHDGPLWWHGWKHUHPDLQGHURIGHIHQGDQWRQH¶VVWDWHPHQWXQGHU5XOH
106.106 SpeFLILFDOO\WKHH[FOXGHGSDUWRIGHIHQGDQWRQH¶VVWDWHPHQWZDVWKDWGHIHQGDQW
two had tried to keep him out of the drug business in order to protect him. 107
7KH6HFRQG&LUFXLWEHJDQLWVDQDO\VLVE\VWDWLQJWKDW5XOH³SHUPLWVDGHIHQGDQW
to introduce the remainder of a statement not otherwise admissible if it is µnecessary to
explain the admitted portion, to place the admitted portion in context, to avoid misleading
the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial understanding of the admitted portion.¶´108
+RZHYHU 5XOH  ³GRHV QRW µrequire introduction of portions of a statement that are
neither explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passages.¶´109 Thus, it is within the
WULDOFRXUW¶VGLVFUHWLRQWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUDUHPDLQGHUVKRXOGFRPHLQDVQHFHVsary for
completeness or should be excluded to prevent an opponent bypassing hearsay rules to
introduce self-serving evidence.110
The Second Circuit then held that the remainder of the statement was properly
H[FOXGHGEHFDXVHGHIHQGDQWWZR¶VVHOI-serving statement that defendant one had attempted
to minimize his role in the conspiracy did nothing to clarify or explain the statement that
the murder victim robbed drug dealers. 111 In so holding, the court reinforced its prior
decision that when determining whether a remainder should be admitted pursuant to Rule
 ³WKH RYHUDUFKLQJ SULQFLSOH >LV WKDW@ WKH WULDO FRXUW¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ [is] to exercise
common sense and a sense of fairness to protect the rights of the parties while remaining
HYHUPLQGIXORIWKHFRXUW¶s obligation to protect the interest of society in the µascertainment
of the truth.¶´112
2. Seventh Circuit

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571,576 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Gonzalez, 399 F. App¶x 645 (quoting United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1982)).
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)).
798 F.2d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States
v. LeFevour, in which a former state court judge was convicted of racketeering, mail fraud,
and filing false income tax returns.113 At trial, the prosecution played a taped conversation
between the defendant and a police officer to show that the defendant knew who the
RIILFHU¶VODZ\HUZDV114 The prosecution did not play a subsequent portion of the recording
LQZKLFKWKHRIILFHUWROGWKH)%,DJHQWVZKRKDGSXWWKHZLUHRQKLPWKDWKHKDG³SXWRQ
KLVEHVWVFDUHDFW´ZLWKWKHGHIHQGDQW115 The defense moved to admit this part of the taped
conversation, but the trial court ruled that it was irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible.116 The
defendant argued on appeal that the remainder of the tape should have been admitted
pursuant to Rule 106.117
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The Seventh Circuit noted that the trial court had implicitly treated Rule 106 as only
a rule of timLQJEXWWKHDSSHOODWHFRXUWFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKLV³GHVFULSWLRQLVPLVOHDGLQJ´118
The court stated that the rule is:
If otherwise inadmissible evidence is necessary to correct a misleading impression, then
either it is admissible for this limited purpose by force of Rule 106 . . . or, if it is inadmissible
(maybe because of privilege), the misleading evidence must be excluded too. The party
against whom that evidence is offered can hardly care which route is taken, provided he
honestly wanted the otherwise inadmissible evidence admitted only for the purpose of
pulling the sting from evidence his opponent wanted to use against him. Rule 106 was not
intended to override every privilege and other exclusionary rule of evidence in the legal
armamentarium, so there must be cases where if an excerpt is misleading the only cure is to
exclude it rather than to put in other excerpts.119

7KLV DSSURDFK HPSKDVL]HV D WULDO FRXUW¶V GLVFUHWLRQ LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU
otherwise inadmissible evidence should be admitted or whether the misleading portion of
a statement should be excluded entirely. Ultimately, the court ruled that the remainder of
the tape was not admissible, not because it was hearsay, but because the original portion
of the tape was a complete statement that was not misleading.120
D. Unaddressed
The Third and Fifth Circuits have not addressed whether Rule 106 allows for the
admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence or is a rule of timing only.
1. Third Circuit
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118. LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981.
119. Id.; see also United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1019 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing LeFevour for the
proposition that ³otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admissible under Rule 106 to correct a misleading
impression or else the misleading evidence must be excluded´).
120. LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981±82.
121. 530 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2008).
122. Id. at 145, 192.
123. Id. at 192.
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984)).
125. Id. (quoting Soures, 736 F.2d at 91).
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7KH 7KLUG &LUFXLW ZDV IDFHG ZLWK WKH LVVXH RI 5XOH ¶V DSSOLFDELOLW\ LQ United
States v. Hoffecker.121 In that case, the defendant was convicted of various wire fraud and
mail fraud charges after the prosecution played a portion of his recorded statement. 122 The
defendant argued that the entire tape should have been admitted into evidence under Rule
106 because it was necessary to rebut his statements in another recording and to rebut other
unrecorded statements to witnesses. 123
The Third Circuit stated that under Rule 106, additional portions of a recording may
EH SOD\HG ³LI LW LV QHFHVVDU\ WR   H[SODLQ WKH DGPLWWHG SRUWLRQ   SODFH WKH DGPLWWHG
portion in context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and impartial
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´124 HRZHYHU ³>W@he Rule does not require introduction of portions of a
statement that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the passages that have been
DGPLWWHG´125 The court did not address whether Rule 106 would allow for the introduction
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of evidence that was otherwise inadmissible. This discussion was unnecessary because the
defendant had failed to show that introduction of the entire tape was necessary to explain
or place his entirely separate statements in context. 126
2. Fifth Circuit

V. FAIRNESS AND RELIABILITY
The failure of the Supreme Court in Rainey to establish clear guidelines for the Rule
106 analysis has led to a confused mixture of rules that depend on where a trial occurs.
This situation is untenable in a modern age when crimes frequently cross jurisdictional
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126. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 137.
127. 91 F.3d 699, 709 (5th Cir. 1996).
128. Id. at 725.
129. Id. at 726.
130. Id. at 727 (quoting United States v. Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103, 1108 (4th Cir. 1977)).
131. Id. at 727.
132. Branch, 91 F.3d at 728±29; see also, United States v. Flores, 293 F. App¶x 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2008)
(stating that Rule 106 only allows the admission of a remainder of a statement that is relevant and necessary to
qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced but failing to address whether the rule allows
for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence).
133. Branch, 91 F.3d at 729 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5077).
134. Id. (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5077).
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The Fifth Circuit wDV IDFHG ZLWK WKH LVVXH RI 5XOH ¶V DSSOLFDELOLW\ LQ United
States v. Branch, in which six defendants were convicted of various crimes that arose out
of a firefight that erupted when ATF agents attempted to execute a search and arrest
warrant.127 At trial, the prosecution introduced a portion of an interview that one of the
defendants gave to a law enforcement officer.128 The government filed a preemptive
motion to prevent the defendant from introducing the other exculpatory portions of the
interview into evidence, and the trial court granted the motion to a large degree.129
7KH)LIWK&LUFXLWEHJDQLWVDQDO\VLVE\VWDWLQJWKDWWKHSXUSRVHRI5XOHLV³WR
permit the contemporaneous introduction of recorded statements that place in context other
writings admittHGLQWRHYLGHQFHZKLFKYLHZHGDORQHPD\EHPLVOHDGLQJ´130 In addition,
WKH FRXUW VWDWHG WKDW WKH ³IDLUQHVV´ VWDQGDUG RI 5XOH  UHTXLUHV WKH UHPDLQGHU RI WKH
VWDWHPHQW WR ³EH UHOHYDQW DQG µnecessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the
portion already introduced.¶´131 The court did not address whether Rule 106 allows for
the introduction of evidence that is otherwise inadmissible. It was unnecessary for the court
to address this issue because the defendant had failed to show how the excluded remainder
of his statement qualified, explained, or placed the admitted portions into context. 132
7KH FRXUW DFNQRZOHGJHG ³WKH GDQJHU LQKHUHQW LQ WKH VHOHFWLYH DGPLVVLRQ RI SRVWDUUHVWVWDWHPHQWV´EXWKHOGWKDW³>Q@HLWKHUWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQQRU5XOH . . requires the
admission of the entire statement once any portion is admitted in a criminal
SURVHFXWLRQ´133 ,QIDFWWKHFRXUWVWDWHGWKDW³>Z@HGRQRYLROHQFHWRFULPLQDOGHIHQGDQWV¶
constitutional rights by applying Rule 106 as written and requiring that a defendant
demonstrate with particularity the unfairness in the selective admission of his post-arrest
VWDWHPHQW´134
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boundaries. Both defendants and prosecutors are entitled to consistent rules. The time has
come for the Supreme Court to establish clear guidelines based on the principles of
fairness, reliability, and limited admissibility.
A. Fairness

If a defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf, he assumes a reciprocal
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and we have consistently rejected arguments
that would allow a defendant to turn the illegal method by which evidence in the
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVVHVVLRQZDVREWDLQHGWRKLVRZQDGYDQWDJHDQGSURYLGHKLPVHOIZLWKD
shield against contradiction of his untruths.140

7KLV VKRZV WKDW WKH &RXUW FRQVLGHUV D ³IDLU´ SURFHVV WR EH RQH LQ ZKLFK RWKHUZLVH
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135. FED. R. EVID. 106.
136. FED. R. EVID. 102.
137. Harold F. Baker, Completing the Rule of Completeness: Amending Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 281, 290 (2018).
138. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5078.1.
139. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1980).
140. Id. (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971)) (internal citation omitted); see also Kansas
v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009) (stating that ³it is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an
affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can . . . provide
himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.´) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65
(1954)).
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Rule 106 allows an opponent to require the introduction of the remainder of a
VWDWHPHQW³WKDWLQIDLUQHVVRXJKWWREHFRQVLGHUHGDWWKHVDPHWLPH´135 Does this vague
notion of fairness mean that Rule 106 allows for the introduction of a remainder that is
otherwise inadmissible? The Supreme Court should rule that it does, if the remainder
satisfies requirements of relevance and reliability.
In determining whether otherwise inadmissible evidence can ever be introduced
under Rule 106, it is essential to look at Rule 102 for the principles that guide interpretation
of the rules. Rule 102 states, ³>W@KHVHUXOHVVKRXOGEHFRQVWUXHGVRDVWRadminister every
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development
RIHYLGHQFHODZWRWKHHQGRIDVFHUWDLQLQJWKHWUXWKDQGVHFXULQJDMXVWGHWHUPLQDWLRQ´ 136
The key principles that should guide the interpretation of 5XOHDUH³IDLUQHVVWKH
GHYHORSPHQWRIHYLGHQFHODZWUXWKDQGMXVWLFH´137 These principles can only be honored
if statements are presented in a way that allows a jury to understand their true meaning.
,QGHHG³>Q@RRQHKDVHYHUH[SODLQHGKRZWKHVHVWandards [in Rule 102] would be met by
a construction that would allow a party to present evidence out of context so as to mislead
the jury, then assert an exclusionary rule to keep the other side from exposing his
GHFHSWLRQ´138
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the meaning and scope of Rule 106,
JXLGDQFHFDQEHREWDLQHGIURPWKH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJVLQDQDORJRXVFDVHV)RULQVWDQFHWKH
Court has held that, although the government cannot introduce the statement of a defendant
in its case in chief when the statement was taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the
VWDWHPHQWFDQEHXVHGWRLPSHDFKWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VLQFRQVLVWHQWWHVWLPRQ\DWWULDO 139 The
Court stated:
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inadmissible evidence can be used to correct a misrepresentation by a party.
However, this does not mean that Rule 106 creates a free-for-all in which an
RSSRQHQW FDQ LQWURGXFH HYHU\ SRUWLRQ RI D VWDWHPHQW ,QGHHG ³ZKHQ 5XOH  LQYRNHV
µIDLUQHVV¶DVWKHVWDQGDUGIRUFRPSOHWHQHVVLWGRHVQRWGRVRLQWKHVHQVHRIµIDLUSOD\¶WR
an opponent required to mud wrestle a dirty proponent but only in the µXQIDLUQHVV¶WKDW
UHVXOWV IURP ORVLQJ WKURXJK LQDFFXUDWH IDFWILQGLQJ´ 141 Fairness is the opportunity to
correct a misleading impression of a statement, not the opportunity to introduce evidence
at will. Thus, the remainder of the statement must be relevant to correcting the misleading
impression.
The best method for determining whether a remainder is relevant to correcting a
misrepresentation under Rule 106 is the four-part test of United States v. Lopez-Medina:
³   LW H[SODLQV WKH DGPLWted evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in context, (3)
avoids misleading the jury, and (4) insures fair and impartial understanding of the
HYLGHQFH´142 7KLVPHWKRGUHFRJQL]HVWKDW³DUHPDLQGHUXQGHUWKHIDLUQHVVWHVWKDVWREH
explanatory of the porWLRQ WKDW LW FRPSOHWHV QRW MXVW RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V WKHRU\ RI WKH
FDVH´143
B. Reliability
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141. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5072.1.
142. 596 F.3d 716, 735 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Zamudio, 1998 WL 1666000, at *6 (10th
Cir. Apr. 6, 1998)).
143. Michael A. Hardin, This Space Intentionally Left Blank: What to do When Hearsay and Rule 106
Completeness Collide, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1304 (2013).
144. See Baker, supra note 137, at 295 (noting that the rule against hearsay ³strives to make inadmissible any
evidence lacking adequate indicia of reliability´).
145. Id. at 298.
146. Id.
147. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
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,Q RUGHU IRU DQ RWKHUZLVH LQDGPLVVLEOH UHPDLQGHU WR EH ³IDLUO\´ LQWURGXFHG XQGHU
Rule 106, it must also have some indicia of reliability. Allowing an unreliable remainder
to be introduced in an alleged attempt to correct a misunderstanding does not serve the end
of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.
Most of the time, a remainder of a statement is otherwise inadmissible because it is
hearsay. Hearsay generally lacks a sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible.144 This
LVHVSHFLDOO\FRQFHUQLQJLIDGHIHQGDQWLV³DOORZHGWRLQWURGXFHRWKHUZLVHLQDGPLVVLEOH
self-serving exculpatory statements, without testifying, under the guise of
completeness´145 ,QGHHG³WRDOORZLQWURGXFWLRQRIVHOI-serving exculpatory statements,
without a guarantee of trustworthiness as prescribed by the rules of evidence, would
XQGHUPLQHWKHDGYHUVDU\V\VWHPLQZKLFKWKHUXOHVRSHUDWH´146
Although it was not in the context of Rule 106, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the problem inherent in admitting exculpatory remainders. In Williamson v. United States,
the Court was confronted with the question of whether the exception to the hearsay rule
for statements against penal interest allows for only inculpatory statements, or also allows
for the remainder that is not inculpatory.147 The Court held that this exception only allows
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inculpatory statements.148 7KH&RXUWVWDWHGWKDWWKHUXOH³LVIRXQGHGRQWKHFRPPRQVHQVH
notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend
not to make self-LQFXOSDWRU\VWDWHPHQWVXQOHVVWKH\EHOLHYHWKHPWREHWUXH´149 However,
This notion simSO\GRHVQRWH[WHQGWRWKHEURDGHUGHILQLWLRQRI³VWDWHPHQW´7KHIDFWWKDWD
person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the
FRQIHVVLRQ¶V QRQ-self-inculpatory parts. One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix
falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its selfinculpatory nature. . . . Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are
most likely to make even when they are false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory,
statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-exculpatory statements.150

This commonsense notion is directly applicable to the Rule 106 analysis. Self-serving
exculpatory remainders should be viewed with caution, and the trial court should only
allow them to be introduced if there is an indicia of reliability.
C. Limited Admissibility
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148. Id. at 600í01.
149. Id. at 599.
150. Id. at 599±600 (emphasis added).
151. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5072 n.21.
152. See Hardin, supra note 143, at 1287 (stating that ³many of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the use
of evidence for one or more particular purposes but allow it for any other purpose´).
153. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
154. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
155. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
156. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
157. FED. R. EVID. 105.
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The fear about remainders that are otherwise inadmissible should be alleviated by
an interpretation that allows them to be introduced for the limited purpose of providing
context to correct a misunderstanding, and not as substantive evidence. Indeed, this was
WKHSUDFWLFHXQGHUWKHFRPPRQODZZKHUH³WKHH[FXOSDWRU\SDUWVRI>D@FRQIHVVLRQ>FRXOG@
RQO\EHXVHGWRQHJDWHWKHSURVHFXWLRQ¶VWUXQFDWed version, not to refute other evidence of
JXLOW´151
Limited admissibility is a part of the rules of evidence. 152 For example, Rule 404(b)
VWDWHVWKDW³>H@YLGHQFHRIDFULPHZURQJRURWKHUDFWLVQRWDGPLVVLEOHWRSURYHDSHUVRQ¶V
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
ZLWKWKH FKDUDFWHU´153 +RZHYHUVXFKHYLGHQFH PD\EH DGPLWWHG³for another purpose,
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or laFNRIDFFLGHQW´154 Similarly under Rule 412, evidence may not
EH DGPLWWHG WR SURYH WKDW ³D YLFWLP HQJDJHG LQ RWKHU VH[XDO EHKDYLRU´ RU WR ³SURYH D
YLFWLP¶VVH[XDOGLVSRVLWLRQ´155 However, evidence of sexual behavior may be admitted to
SURYHWKDW³VRPHRQHRWKer than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other
SK\VLFDOHYLGHQFH´RU³WRSURYHFRQVHQW´ 156 )XUWKHU5XOHVWDWHVWKDW³>L@IWKHFRXUW
admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose²but not against another
party or for another purpose²the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its
SURSHUVFRSHDQGLQVWUXFWWKHMXU\DFFRUGLQJO\´ 157

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 34 Side B

09/18/2019 11:37:45

HILLS, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

62

9/17/2019 2:03 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:45

The decision of the Supreme Court in Rainey supports the conclusion that otherwise
inadmissible remainders have only limited admissibility. Indeed, when the Court held that
WKH UHPDLQGHU RI WKH SODLQWLII¶V OHWWHU VKRXOG KDve been allowed, it stated that ³>W@KH
defendants would, of course, have been entitled to a limiting instruction pursuant to Rule
KDGWKH\UHTXHVWHGLW´158 Under this reasoning, otherwise inadmissible remainders
are not substantive evidence under Rule 106.
Some may argue that limiting instructions are not entirely effective. 159 However,
jurors promise to follow instructions and there would be no purpose to providing them
with instructions at all if the system did not trust them to keep their promise. In addition,
³OLPLWLQJLQVWUXFWLRQVGRFRQVWUDLQWKHDWWRUQH\V´ 160 7KHUHLVYDOXHLQNQRZLQJWKDW³>L@Q
closing arguments, neither attorney may ask the jury to draw those forbidden inferences
RUPDNHDQDUJXPHQWXVLQJWKHHYLGHQFHIRUDQLPSURSHUSXUSRVH´161
VI. CONCLUSION
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158. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 158, 173 n.17 (1988).
159. See Hardin, supra note 143, at 1288 (stating that ³it is unclear how effective limiting instructions are at
preventing juries from using evidence for prohibited purposes´).
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1229, 1236 (2007)).
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Rule 106 was adopted over four decades ago, and it has been a source of confusion
and inconsistency ever since. The Supreme Court should resolve the split amongst the
circuits by providing a clear interpretation of the meaning of Rule 106. The interpretation
that follows purpose of the rules of evidence and general notions of fairness is that an
opponent may introduce a remainder, even if the remainder is otherwise inadmissible.
However, the remainder must be necessary to place the original part of the statement in
context. In addition, there must be an indicia of reliability in order for self-serving
exculpatory remainders to be introduced. Finally, the remainder should be admitted only
for the limited purpose of context, and the jury should be instructed accordingly. This
interpretation means that in practice, many remainders will not be introduced at trial.
Sometimes fairness will require Rule 106 to act as a rule of incompleteness.
Rule 106 is based on the concept of fairness in the presentation of evidence.
However, no system in which the interpretation of the rule depends on the location of the
court can possibly be fair. Indeed, inconsistency in this regard is the very definition of
unfairness. It is time for the Supreme Court to eliminate this unfairness once and for all.

